Why All Beings With Potential Must Be Actualised

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This article will defend the claim that every being with inherent potential must be actualised by another being.

This article is a supplement to the original Stage 1: From Change to Pure Act article where I lay out the prerequisite metaphysical notions that I will be assuming here. It's recommended that one takes a look at that original article before coming here.

1 Distinction

To start, I will point out that actualities and potentialities within a being are only distinguished by noting that the former is actualised and the latter is not.

Actualities are facts that are actually true about a being[I go through what I mean by being in more detail here in the Beings section] and potentialities are facts that are not true, but could be true about a being.

2 Explanation

However, for any being that is a composite of act and potency[that has both actuality and potentiality], there must be something that distinguishes its act from its potency.

This is because for every fact about a being, it is not inherently clear whether or not that fact is actualised or not.

So, there must be something that determines whether or not a fact about a being is actually true or potentially true.

If there were nothing that could determine whether something in a being were act or potency, then the existence of that being would have no explanation[or reason], which is an absurdity[as it violates the Principle of Sufficient Reason, that I plan to defend elsewhere].

3 Actualisation

And as we already pointed out, what determines whether or not something in a being is act or potency is actualisation, which as we point out here, must be done by another being, as all specific potentialities must be actualised by an external object.

4 Conclusion

In conclusion, for any being that is a composite of act and potency, it will need to be actualised by a being other than itself to distinguish its act from its potency.

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Why Nothing Can Actualise Itself[In the Same Respect]

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Here, I will defend the claim that "no thing can be both moved and mover in the same respect".

This article is meant to supplement the original Stage 1: From Change to Pure Act article that I wrote, where I introduced all the key terms and concepts that I will be using here. I will not repeat them here, so it is advised that you read the original article first.

So, in the original article, I claim that beings composed of actuality and potentiality must be actualised by other beings to show why there must be a being of pure actuality. In these articles, I will elaborate on concepts that were mentioned in previous articles so that readers can better grasp the new concepts mentioned.

1 Beings

To start, what I mean by being, more specifically, is any individual thing that exists. So, a water bottle would be a being. A human being would be a being[as the term indicates]. A book would be a being. A planet would be a being as well. It really depends on the scale you are using to discuss things.

I will also note that beings are composed of different portions[so to speak] of actuality and potentiality. A being can be composed of some actuality and some potentiality or be composed of purely actuality, but no object can be composed of pure potentiality. This is explained in Objection: Is a Purely Actual Being Logically Impossible?[in the Actuality Grounds Potentiality section].

So, a water bottle has certain actualities and certain potentialities. The water bottle actually exists, it is actually at this spatial location at this point in time, so on and so forth. It also has many potentialities, like the potential to be at this other spatial location or even to not exist[which is different from merely not existing][I explain why a purely actual being would not have the potential to not exist in Objection: Is a Purely Actual Being Logically Impossible?].

In general, it is true that beings of our experience are composed of far more potentiality than actuality, as any given being of our experience is actually doing far less than what it could do, potentially.

I would argue that any being can be broken down merely into its parts of actuality and potentiality, the same way that any being can be abstracted into its existence and non-existence[this is because actuality and potentiality are effectively a more nuanced version existence and non-existence].

2 Actualisation

When a being is actualised to do something, some of its potentials are actualised. To take a concrete example, let us take a beach ball.

The beach ball actually exists at a specific location and time. The beach ball has many potentials, such as to be at this other location or to move in this direction or this other direction.

When I, a human, with my own mixture of actualities and potentialities, actualise the ball to move, I move the ball in the respect of movement. This sounds like a tautology, but move here is a synonym for actualise.

Let us look at another example: when I push a trolley that pushes another trolley[say I am trying to keep two trollies back at where I found them], I actualise[or move] the first trolley, that then actualises the second trolley.

Notice that whenever one object moves[or actualises] another object, in that specific respect in which the mover moves the moved, the mover will impart actuality to the moved.

3 Similar Respects

Some may notice that I have been using the phrase "in the same respect" when talking about the causal principle for actualisations of potentials. An explanation of the causal principle can be found in Stage 1: From Change to Pure Act.

What do I mean when I say that "nothing can be moved and mover in the same respect"? What I mean is that for any actualisation of a potential, the actualisation of the specific potential[say the potential to move in space] cannot be actualised by the being that is being actualised[it cannot move to then cause itself to move, it can only be moved by another actually moving thing].

Let us take the example of moving a ball again. Based on the causal principle, the ball could never move itself. If we're going to be more specific, the ball could never actualise its own potential to move.

But why is this the case? Could there not be some actuality that composes the ball that actualises the potentiality of the ball to move?

3.1 The Nature of Actualisation

The answer to this question would be no, as when a potential is actualised, what could be said to happen is that something that was false about something becomes true.

So, it was false that the ball was moving and it was made true that the ball was moving.

There are necessary preconditions for a potentials to be actualised. For example, if the ball is hit by another ball, then the ball will start moving. This is just to say that when a ball hits another ball, the ball's potential to move will be actualised.

So, in order for potentials to be actualised, a necessary precondition must be met. And these necessary preconditions must be actual and not merely potential to actualise the potential.

So, for any potential that an object has, it must have that potential because it internally does not already have any actuality that can actualise that potential, or else that potential would already be actual.

So, for any potential that is not already actual in an object, it must be actualised by another object.

3.2 Parts and Wholes

However, this applies only when speaking in terms of a specific respect[like in the respect of movement, for example]. Things seem to actualise themselves all the time. For example, I actualise my own potential for my arm to move, or I actualise my own potential to move forward. Does this not contradict what I said previously?

No, as once you further analyse this so-called "self-actualisation", you will realise that it isn't self-actualisation at all, but different internal parts of the whole that actualise each other.

For example, in the case of me actualising my own potential to move forward when I walk, what really is happening is that my brain is actualising the potential of a neuron to fire which actualises the potential of my muscles to expand and contract which then makes me move.

What could not happen is that my muscles actualise their own potential to expand and contract.

4 Conclusion

In conclusion, we have demonstrated that no object[or being] can actualise itself in the same respect[or no thing can be moved and mover in the same respect], which supports the causal principle used for stage 1 Arguments from Motion.

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Change, Existence and Essentially-ordered Causal Series

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Here, I will defend the fact that some series involving change really are essentially-ordered causal series with more rigour and concrete examples.

This will supplement the original stage 1 article, where I briefly cover some of the content that I will go into more detail about here. So it is advised that one reads the original article that outlines stage 1 of the Argument from Motion[or at least my rendition of it] before coming here to get a more in-depth explanation of why causal series involving change are essentially-ordered and not accidentally-ordered. I will not be going through the prerequisite metaphysics again, as I already do that in Stage 1: From Change to Pure Act.

1 Change and Accidentally-ordered Causal Series

So, let us first note that there are accidentally-ordered causal series that involve change. Broadly, change is any actualisation of a potential. So, the passage of time, which would be a series of temporal events following each other, would involve change and be an accidentally-ordered causal series[as defined in Stage 1: From Change to Pure Act]. This is because the potentials for later events to come about, or exist, are actualised by previous events. Of course, this all assumes an A-theory of time[Presentism]. I briefly describe the A-theory of time here.

Another example of this would be a set of dominoes toppling. This involves change as the potential of each domino to topple is actualised by the previous domino. Yet, as we defined, such as causal series is accidentally-ordered.

So, there are some causal series that involve an actualisation of a potential that are not essentially-ordered and would not be viable to argue for a being of pure act.

2 Change and Essentially-ordered Causal Series

However, that isn't to say that all causal series involving actualisations of potentials are accidentally-ordered.

Consider me pulling a rope that pulls a cart. I actualise the rope's potential to actualise the cart's potential to move[in the direction that I pull it, according to Newton's First Law of Motion, of course]. This series therefore involves change. Yet, upon further reflection, it is an essentially-ordered series, since if I stopped pulling the rope, all of the other members would stop moving as well. This would be true according to how we defined an essentially-ordered series in Stage 1: From Change to Pure Act.

Another example would be a man pushing a cart. If the man stopped pushing the cart, the cart would stop moving. Yet another example would be the locomotive that we mentioned in Stage 1: From Change to Pure Act.

3 Existence

Another less intuitive example that will be important for other articles would be the existence of any thing at a given time.

3.1 Parts and Wholes

For something to exist, their parts must be arranged in the specific way to allow for their existence. For example, the atoms[or whatever is fundamental, which would be elementary particles at this point in our knowledge] that make up a methane molecule[one carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms] have to be arranged in the specific way to allow for the methane molecule to exist as a methane molecule.

However, they have the potential to be arranged as anything else, maybe the hydrogen atoms in the methane molecule could form a hydrogen molecule[two hydrogen atoms] instead, or the carbon atom in the methane molecule form a carbon dioxide molecule[one carbon atom, two oxygen atoms].

3.2 Actualisation of Potentials and Existence

So the potentials of the parts of the methane molecule[the atoms that compose it] must be actualised to form the methane molecule and not some other molecule.

This type of reasoning would apply to any part of anything.

So, to illustrate why this would qualify to be an essentially-ordered causal series, let us consider the example of a human being[something more relatable].

So, a human being is made of parts[this is obvious, especially since they can(very regrettably) be separated]. We have arms, legs, torsi[search it up], heads and whatever else.

The existence of these parts, in some way, actualise the existence of the human being. This is because if the parts didn't exist, then the potential of the human being to exist could not be actualised.

However, the parts have their own parts too. Take our feet, they are parts legs[I'm not entirely sure about the anatomy side of things, but let's assume that this is true], and they actualise the existence of the leg[which actualises the existence of the human being].

We can continue this for however long we like, going from our individual organs, to our individual tissue, to our individual cells, to our individual molecules, then atoms, then sub-atomic particles, then elementary particles, and so on and so forth.

3.3 Ontological Priority

Before I move on with my explanation, let me point out that the parts of a thing would be prior to the thing itself. Ontologically prior, we may say. This is because the individual parts can exist without the whole, but the whole cannot exist without the parts.

Moving on, we will notice that the existence of a thing at any given time is a sort of causal series. The prior members, the parts of a thing, actualise the potential of the whole to exist[or you could just say cause for now], so on and so forth.

3.4 Existence Involves an Essentially-ordered Causal Series

And if the prior members[or parts] stopped existing, or were no longer actualised to be arranged in that specific manner, then the whole would also stop existing, or stop being caused to exist.

Based on our definition of an essentially-ordered causal series, the existence of any thing at any time would qualify.

Now, I am aware of Existential Inertia and plan to write something about that on this blog.

But for now, just be aware that existence involves actualisation of potentials and is an essentially-ordered causal series. This will be important for other articles.

4 Conclusion

In conclusion, while there are causal series involving change that are accidentally-ordered, there are many examples of them that are essentially-ordered.

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Stage 1: From Change to Pure Act

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The first stage of the Argument from Motion is to show that a being of pure actuality exists. To do this, I must first explain some key concepts in Aristotelian metaphysics. I will further defend claims that I make in this article in other ones, but it's recommended that one finishes this entire article before moving on to others.

1 Act and Potency

First, change is an actualisation of a potential. A potential is anything that an object might do, and when a specific potential is actualised, the object actually does whatever it is that it could have done.

For example, I have the potential to stand up[I might stand up, but actually am sitting down] and when I stand, my potential to stand is actualised and I then actually stand.

2 Accidentally-ordered Causal Series

Accidentally-ordered causal series are causal series where previous members do not need to continue to exist in order for the causal series to continue to exist.

For example, a domino chain reaction is an example of an accidentally-ordered causal series, as previous members of the reaction do not need to be present for the series to continue. So, if I were to remove a domino that had already fallen, the dominoes would continue to topple.

Also, in principle, an accidentally-ordered causal series could extend back into infinity. Taking the domino chain reaction example again, in principle, the dominoes could have been toppling for past-eternity.

3 Essentially-ordered Causal Series

Essentially-ordered causal series are causal series where previous members do need to continue to exist in order for the causal series to continue to exist.

For example, a stack of books is an example of an essentially-ordered causal series. This may not seem like a causal series at first, but the book at the bottom causes the book above it to be held up and that book causes the book above it to be held up, and so on. Notice that for this case, if any one of the previous members in the series[say the books below the top book], the causal chain would cease, and the books would drop, not being held up anymore.

Also, this type of series would require a "first" member, of sorts. This is because members in such series have derived causal power and would need to derive their causal power from a first member with underived causal power, such as the bottom book that holds up the rest.

Take another example, a locomotive that pulls many carts behind it. Each of the carts have derived causal power and would not be able to pull themselves, but are pulling each cart behind them. The thing in this series that is imparting causal power to the entire system is the locomotive, that has underived causal power in itself.

4 Causal Principle

No object can actualise itself. To put it differently, nothing can be moved and mover in the same respect. For example, a ball's potential to be moved five meters forward cannot be actualised by the ball, but must be actualised by something external to it. So, in the respect of movement, the ball cannot actualise its own. However, the ball can actualise some other thing, like another ball to move.

5 Actus Purus

With all the background metaphysics set in place, let us reason from the existence of change to something that is pure actuality[in Latin, actus purus].

First, we begin by observing that change exists. Since change is an actualisation of a potential, actualisations of potentials exist.

But since nothing can actualise its own potential in the same respect, this series of actualisations of potentials must end[in having an ontologically fundamental member, or a "first" member], as it is an essentially-ordered causal series.

It is an essentially-ordered causal series because actualisations of potentials are concurrent. For example, if I were to push a cart, an instance of change, the causal series here is concurrent, so me pushing the cart and the cart getting pushed occur simultaneously. If I stopped pushing the cart, the cart would not continue to move.

Change like this occurs all the time.

Things of our experience are composites of actuality and potentiality. So, when an object that is a composite of actuality and potentiality actualises another object, it itself has to be actualised by another object.

However, since this series is hierarchical and must end, it must end in a being[being here is used in a broad sense, describing all existing entities] that is purely actual. This is because a purely actual being does not need to be actualised by another being as it has no potentialities. 

If not ending in a purely actual being, it will either end in a purely potential being or a being that is a composite of actuality and potentiality. However, it cannot be a being that is a composite of actuality and potentiality as this being would have to be actualised by another being, continuing the series. And it cannot be a purely potential being as potentiality is grounded in actuality and therefore there cannot be potentiality without actuality, so there cannot be a purely potential being with no actuality.

So, there must be a purely actual being that is not a composite of actuality and potentiality, but only is "made" of actuality.

Note that my argumentation here only applies to some types of change, and I will explain that in more detail in a separate article. But as long as there is at least one type of series involving change that operates in the way that I have described above, the argument will be successful. And, as I will show in a separate article, there are many causal series involving change that are as I described. 

Formal Articulation of Stage 1

Put more formally, the argument would go like:
P1 change exists
P2 so, actualisations of potentials exist
P3 some series of actualisations of potentials are essentially-ordered series
P4 so, these series must end
P5 these series either end with a purely actual being, a purely potential being or a being composite of actuality and potentiality
P6 these series does not end with a purely potential being or a being composite of actuality and potentiality
P7 so, these series end with a purely actual being
P8 so, a purely actual being exists

Further Defenses of the Claims Made Here:

• Change, Existence and Essentially-ordered Causal Series
• Why Nothing Can Actualise Itself[In the Same Respect]
• Why All Beings With Potential Must Be Actualised

Other Considerations and Objections:

• Is a Purely Actual Being Logically Impossible?
• The Argument from Motion, B-Theory and Cartesian Doubt

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Is A Purely Actual Being Logically Impossible?

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Is a purely actual being logically impossible? The answer to this question may not seem too obvious at first, but it will be the question that we will be considering today.

Purely Actual

Maybe it would help to first define what a purely actual being would be. First, let us note that things of our experience undergo actualisations of potentials[they change]. A potential just describes anything that an object might do, and when a potential is actualised, the object actually does it.

For example, I have the potential to stand up[I might stand up, but actually am not standing up] and when I stand, my potential to stand is actualised and I then actually stand.

The things of our experience are so-called composites of actualities and potentialities. That is to say, the things of our experience both can and are doing things. Such as existing, sitting, moving, standing, so on and so forth.

Now, I will not be explaining why a purely actual being must exist in this article, as this is not what I set out to do here. I will be explaining why it is indeed logically coherent that a purely actual being exists.

So, a purely actual being would be a being that has no potentialities but only has actualities[contrary to the things of our experience]. So, a purely actual being would not "be able to" do anything, like how I am able to stand up. The purely actual being would just be doing, or actualising.

1 Objection 1: Potential to Not Exist

Now, one might object that it is not possible for a purely actual being to exist as it is not possible for any being to have no potentialities, because all beings exist[that is why they are said to be], meaning that they have the potential to not exist.

1.1 Actuality Grounds Potentiality

My response to this would be that since the purely actual being has no potentialities, it does not actually have the potential not to exist.

At first, this answer may seem somewhat ad-hoc.

However, once we further consider what actuality and potentiality are, as well as their relationship, we quickly realise that this property of a purely actual being is necessary if we are to call it purely actual.

What is the specific relationship between actuality and potentiality? First, it is important to note that potentiality is grounded in actuality. Only actual things can have potentials while being actual, but potential things can never have actuality while being potential. This is also obvious when we consider that existence itself is an actuality.

With this in mind, there can indeed be purely actual beings without potentiality but no purely potential beings without actuality, since actuality can exist without potentiality but potentiality cannot exist without actuality[as actuality pre-exists potentiality].

So, if a purely actual being to exist to ground all other actualities and potentialities[as certain arguments that will not be presented in this article show], it would have to exist before potentialities for potentialities to even exist, which would include the potential for non-existence.

And if a purely actual being existed, it would have no potentialities, which would exclude the potentiality for it to not exist.

1.2 Semantics

A second way I would respond is to point out that when we talk about actualities and potentialities, we are always making positive claims.

For example, I do not say that my potentiality to sit down is not actualised when I stand up, I say that my potentiality to stand up is actualised.

Similarly, when I say that I exist, I would not now say that I have a potential to not exist, but that my potential to exist is being actualised. If I were to cease to exist, I would say that my potential to exist is no longer being actualised.

Now, the way we speak here is very important. If we wanted to use this "potential to not do x" semantics, we would have to apply that to everything else we talk about when speaking about actualities and potentialities.

This way, we would be consistent.

So, there is no issue saying that the purely actual being doesn't not exist, but then you would have to apply this "not" language to everything.

For example, my potential to stand up is not actualised, and my potential to not stand up is actualised.

In the case of the purely actual being, we could do the same and say that it actualises not not x or not not y, but we would have to be consistent. This way, it is exactly the same as saying that the purely actual being actualises x and y and everything else.

The mistake that this objection makes is that it retains the positive language of actualisation for everything else to do with the purely actual being but then sneaks in negative language of actualisation when it comes to the purely actual being's existence.

So, it would say, sure the purely actual being actualises x and actualises y but it also exists, meaning that it now has the potential to not exist, and this just means that it actually exists.

If the objection were consistent, it would say that the purely actual being has the potentiality to actualise not x and the potentiality to actualise not y, which is just to say that it actually actualises x and y, which is consistent with the claim of there being a purely actual being.

So, this ends up being a bit of a word game and is perfectly consistent with our notion of actuality and potentiality and there being a purely actual being.

2 Objection 2: Mutually Exclusive Actualities

Now, how about the objection that it is not possible for a purely actual being to exist as there are certain actualities that are mutually exclusive? For example, the actuality of walking and not walking.

It will be first helpful to note that a purely actual being would not be in space or time, as to be in space or time presupposes that one is extended, which implies that one is a body, and bodies can undergo change. Since a purely actual being would not be able to undergo change[nor even be able to do anything, as to have an ability implies having a potentiality], a purely actual being would not be in space or time.

So, the above example would not apply to a purely actual being. However, the point remains that there must be some actions, whether they need to be done within the confines of time and space or not, that are mutually exclusive.

Now, by my lights, there is only one case when actions are mutually exclusive, when the actions entail A and not A. So, going left and right are mutually exclusive since going left implies going not right and going right implies going right.

Like I said, such examples don't apply to a purely actual being, since it would not be within time and space, but the point remains.

2.1 Misunderstanding

My response would be that the argument only applies to things with potentialities. It mistakes the fact that there are mutually exclusive potentialities[E.g., the potential to go left and the potential to go down can both coexist] with the fact that these mutually exclusive potentialities cannot both be actualised and applies it to a purely actual being.

To understand my current point, let us consider me, a human. I am composed so-to-speak of actuality and potentiality. For example, I am actually sitting and typing and existing. I am also potentially standing and walking here and there and everywhere else.

Now, my potential to be at location A and location B cannot be simultaneously actualised, as A implies not B and B implies not A, meaning that they are mutually exclusive.

However, this is not to say that a purely actual being could not indeed actualise both at the same time, since the above scenario occurs in a single world, so to speak. In a single world, A and not A cannot occur simultaneously. 

But for a purely actual being that is not within time and space[as it cannot change], there is no issue saying that it just actualises A and not A at the same time and in separate "worlds", where they can both occur without contradicting each other.

2.2 Active Potency

Of course, this whole thing assumes that we don't consider a purely actual being's active potencies. Once we consider that, this objection drops dead as the purely actual being now doesn't have to actualise A and not A at the same time, as the purely actual being can have many active potencies that are not being actualised.

To call active potencies "potencies" is misleading, as active potencies really are just actualities relative to the substance that possesses them, helping to preserve the pure actual being's being purely actual.

3 Objection 3: All Actualisers Change While Actualising

Another objection would stem from the observation that actualisers are also actualised while they are actualising. For example, when I push a box that pushes another box, while the first box actualises the other box, it itself is also being actualised by my hand and my hand is also being actualised by another thing, so on and so forth. Therefore, if a being of pure act were an actualiser, it would have to be actualised itself, meaning that it has potential and thus, a being of pure act is logically impossible.

3.1 The Point

This objection seems to miss the point of stage 1 of the Argument from Motion entirely, as the whole point of this first stage is to demonstrate that indeed not all actualisers change will actualising, or else there would be no change at all. So, this point is explicitly dealt with by stage 1 of the Argument from Motion.

4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the idea of a purely actual being is logically possible, and I would argue metaphysically necessary, but that's not within the scope of the current article.

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Knowledge, Plato and Descartes

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So, I'm currently reading a lot on Epistemology because I'm currently in Part II: Epistemology of Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview[PFCW]. Once I'm done with this part, I'll start making my notes for it.

I've also have been getting more exposure to Epistemology because I've been reading more Philosophy of Mind, which is heavily related to Epistemology.

So, this will be the first of many articles talking about, outlining and defending[as far as I can] my general thoughts on Epistemology and my various epistemological at various points in time.

But before I begin, let me note that I'm currently just some layman who is interested in philosophy, so expect many mistakes in a lot of my work and feel free to email me or comment any thoughts you have on my views.

Also, if it seems like all I that will be doing is making claims, that's because that really is all that I am doing. I don't plan to defend any of my views here because I would like to do that with more rigour in future and separate articles, once I've read more on the individual topics.

1 General Views So Far

So, after reading the first chapter of Part II in PFCW and the first chapter of Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide[PM:BG], I've noticed that I find Internalism and Indirect Realism to be very plausible views. Of course, these are my views before I do any further reading on the topics.

I probably identify more with Internalism and Indirect Realism because I am a Dualist, so I believe that the mental substance[or in Latin, res cognitans] and the physical substance, extended in space[or in Latin, res extensa] are distinct substances. Of course, these types of debates are very nuanced, so my views may change in the future[though I predict that any movement I make in my views would be towards Idealism, rather than go in the opposite direction and become a Physicalist].

2 Tripartite Analysis and Gettier-type Counterexamples

As for my thoughts on Gettier-type Counterexamples and the tripartite analysis[knowledge as justified true belief], I'm not entirely sure where I stand, because the whole topic seems to be very complicated. But I would probably approach the issue by supplementing the tripartite analysis, because I don't find the "justification" criterion in the tripartite analysis to be worth changing or removing, especially since I would identify more with Internalism.

3 Plato and Knowledge

I would say that Plato was right to say that knowledge is at least justified true belief, and don't find anything wrong with that.

Though I will say that based on my studies on Plato[someone that I love to read and read about], it seems that Plato would approach the Gettier-type Counterexamples by saying that those in such examples did not have sufficient justification. 

I say this because Plato seemed to have a much stricter criteria for knowledge than most of us do. Just take the Jury's Problem, for example. 

However, this is all just my own speculation and shouldn't be taken too seriously.

4 Descartes' Cogito

As for Descartes' Cogito, I'm still not entirely sure about my thoughts on it. I've heard some say that it's circular reasoning, yet I don't find that view particularly convincing.

From my understanding of the Cogito, what Descartes sets out to show is that we can know for certainty that we exist because to do any sort of thinking, like ask whether or not we exist, presupposes that we exist. So, we can know for certain that we exist as our justification for our existence[whatever that may be] entails knowledge of our existence.

Now, this was famously laid out by Descartes as "I think, therefore I am" or "Cogito ergo sum". This is because to think is to be.

Some have said that this is circular reasoning as what Descartes is effectively saying is "I am, therefore I am" and that he has not provided a justification for "I am". They say this because they say that "I think" assumes that "I am".

Note that this is just my understanding of critics' of the Cogito's arguments and it may not be properly representative of what they actually say. If I recall correctly, I've heard this from someone on Discord before.

However, assuming that whatever I just said really is their view, I don't find it too convincing. I find that they are merely repeating Descartes' reasoning. To me, Descartes point was indeed that "I think" assumes "I am", the same way "I know x" assumes "I can know x". So, I don't exactly see the issue here, and as far as I know, many others agree with me[though many others disagree, but this is just part and parcel of philosophy]. I also admit that this reasoning could very well be circular, but circular in a sort of valid sense.

5 Future Plans

5.1 Philosophy of Mind

So, now that I've laid out some of my thoughts on contentious issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Epistemology, let me list a few books that I plan to read on this specific topic in future.

Since I am especially interested in the Philosophy of Mind[with a lesser but still present interest in Epistemology, and one that is growing as I dive deeper into it], I have a few books that I plan to read on the topic.

First, I want to finish reading Edward Feser's introduction to the field, Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide. Then I will try to read as many of the books in Feser's further reading lists that I can get my hands on.

I am also starting to read Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy. While it's important to keep up to date on what contemporary philosophers think and defend about certain topics, it's equally as important to know what the ones the came before thought and defended about the very same topics.

I would also like to read Michael Huemer's defence of Direct Realism and give my thoughts on that and try to defend Indirect Realism.

5.2 Epistemology

As for Epistemology, I would like to finish Part II: Epistemology of PFCW, then go on to read whatever is in the recommended reading list.

I am also currently taking a course in Philosophy for an online certificate from IAP Career College, where they touch on Epistemology.

I would also like to read Plato's dialogues concerning Epistemology, like the Theaetetus and the Meno, just to name a few.

I would also like to read some stuff concerning Skepticism.

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Indirect Realism and the External World

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On the Philosophy Forum, a very obviously intelligent individual[saying this in case he ever decides to pay my blog a visit, but these sentiments more or less line up with my own], Banno, who is a Direct Realist, criticised the Indirect Realist position by saying that it wholly cuts us off from the external world.

Banno's Claim

He claims that on Indirect Realism, we cannot claim that we see a cup, but a representation of the cup[which I agree with], and that we cannot claim that the cup has a handle, but that a cup-like thing has a handle-like thing. He claims that this leads us to have almost no access to the external world. To quote him:

"So we have two scenarios. In both there are things in the world. In both there are representations of those things. But in indirect realism one says that "what I see is the representation". Here the "I" doing the "seeing" is seperate to the representation, and the "I" never sees the thing.

Now this leads to various difficulties. It means, for instance, that when you say that you see the cup has a handle, what you mean is that the representation of the cup has a handle. You are not saying anything about the cup. It leads to a whole network of philosophical garden paths in which, absurdly, the self is forever "cut off" from the world in which it lives."

My Response

I understand his concerns, however, I feel that this comes from a slight misunderstanding[not that I am in any position to correct anyone on any topic] of the Indirect Realist view.

He seems to assume that we can never know the cup just because we do not know it directly. However, I feel that this seems to fail to take into account that all the Indirect Realist claims is that what we know directly, what we are consciously aware of, is our perception of the cup, but what the perception is directly "linked" to is indeed the cup.

Pedantry

So, what we perceive is indeed the actual cup. And, for the sake of not being overly pedantic, we can really say that a cup is in front of us and that the cup has a handle. Like for many things, we do not speak about them scientifically or ontologically accurately when using vernacular language.

For example, we say that the sun rises and not that this quantum whatever occurs and this other quantum process takes place, which would be the most accurate description we have of reality at this point in our understanding.

So, I find, as an Indirect Realist, no issue in saying that I see a cup, even though I do not think that what I am directly experiencing is a cup.

Sensing Versus Having Direct Consciousness Of

However, it would be useful here to make a distinction between sensing[like seeing, hearing, smelling, etc.] and directly being consciously aware of. I have no problem affirming that I really do see a cup with a handle. I just don't think that what I am directly consciously aware of is a cup with a handle, but my perception of a cup with a handle, through which I see the cup with a handle.

My view could be illustrated as such:

So, as you can see, the relationship between you and the external world is that you experience it, the relationship between you and your perception is that you are directly consciously aware of it and the relationship between your perception and the external world is that it directly represents it.

On this model, there are no "philosophical garden paths". We do experience the external world, but through our perception. 

Skepticism

Once we adequately deal with skepticism, as philosophers of every time period have, to varying degrees of success, as skepticism, historically, has this pesky habit of coming back, we will notice that Indirect Realists have no problem with saying that we can know the external world.

Now, let me preemptively give answers[not necessarily satisfactory ones] to an objection.

Why think that there is only one veil of perception? If there is one, what reasons do we have to think that there could not be more than just one?

I would reply to this by stating that it ultimately doesn't matter how many veils of perceptions there are, as long as at the end of the chain, the external world is waiting for us, since no important information is lost from the external world to us as it goes through our perception.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the semantics of Indirect Realism does not cut off from the external world any more than the semantics of Direct Realism, contrary to Banno's claims here:

"The physics and physiology is the same in both cases. The wording in the first account cuts one off from the world. The wording in the second account embeds one in the world. The framing, the grammar one chooses, has consequences well beyond mere perception."

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The Argument from Delay for Indirect Realism and the B-theory of Time

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On Discord the other day, I was arguing with a Direct Realist and he gave a criticism of what I call the Argument from Delay for Indirect Realism. To read more about that, you can read my notes on it here.

This article will just assume that everyone has some working knowledge of Indirect Realism.

The person on Discord said that the argument from delay assumes that Presentism, or the A-theory of time, is true, as opposed to Eternalism, or the B-theory of time. Due to the fact that I haven't written anything on the philosophy of time yet, I will briefly explain what the general A and B theories of time describe.

Presentism and Eternalism

Presentism is the view that the present moment has a special ontological status(a special status having to do with its existence) as compared to the past and future moments, namely that it exists while other moments do not. 

Eternalism is the view that the present moment is no different from past and future moments in terms of its ontology. That is to say, the past, future and present all exist at the same time. 

I assume that there are other nuances that I'm not aware of, but for present purposes, no pun intended, I think that these definitions will suffice. 

We can also ignore the metaphysical implications of each theory of time.

The Criticism

Now, the Discord user's(and I'm not using this as a pejorative) criticism to the argument from delay was that it assumed Presentism, and would fail on Eternalism.

His basic reasoning was that on Eternalism, what I experience would be as real as what actually exists in the present, as what I experience is in the past. Therefore, the argument from delay would fail, as it would fail to show that what I experience at any moment does not exist. I won't be explaining the argument from delay here.

I have two possible replies.

Presentism is True

First, I could argue that Presentism is true and Eternalism is false. I personally do hold to Presentism and may write something on it here one day, but I also understand that Eternalism has some good arguments going for it. So, for the sake of not going down the ontology of time rabbit hole, I will instead show that the argument from delay still works even on Eternalism.

The Argument Works on Eternalism

Second, I could show that the argument from delay still works on Eternalism. It seems to me that his criticism stems from a misunderstanding of the argument from delay. He assumes that the argument from delay tries to show that what we perceive at any time is not what actually exists.

However, this is not what the argument tries to show.

What the argument from delay tries to argue for is that what we perceive at any time is not what actually exists at that time.

So, as long as what we perceive at time,t ,does not exist at time, t, even if what we perceive exists at another time, t - 1, for example, then the argument from delay is successful.

Whether one is a Presentist or Eternalist, the will both agree that distinct moments in time exist(well, this assumes that you're not a Parmenidean psychopath). We all agree that any time, t, is not the same as some other time, t + 1, for example.

All the argument from delay tries to show, and what I think that it shows successfully, is that what you perceive at time, t, does not exist at time, t.

And because of this fact, it is unlikely that you experience the object, O, that you perceive directly, or else what you perceive and your perception of it would correspond at any time, t.

As such, one's philosophy of time will not affect the argument from delay for indirect realism and the Discord user's(once again, this is not used derisively) criticism here fails.

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Notes: Plato: A Very Short Introduction: Chapter 1: Arguing With Plato The Jury's Problem

Notes: Plato: A Very Short Introduction: Chapter 1: Arguing with Plato the Jury's Problem

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Purpose

This is the first post in the Plato: A Very Short Introduction notes series, on Chapter 1: Arguing with Plato's the Jury's Problem.

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Content

1 Knowledge and Belief - The Jury's Problem

2 The Theaetetus - Socrates as Midwife of Ideas

3 Referring to Plato's Works

4 Methods of Transferring Knowledge - The Jury's Problem

4.1 Unreliable Methods - Persuasion

4.2 Types of Beliefs and Methods

4.3 A Conflict of Proposals

4.3.1 A Deeper Look

4.3.2 Recollection

4.3.3 A High Standard

4.4 Plato's Style of Argumentation

5 Theory of Forms

6 How to Approach Plato

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1 Knowledge and Belief - The Jury's Problem

Consider that you are on a jury and hear about how a man is attacked. Say you are convinced and believe him. As it turns out, the man really was attacked.

Do you really know that he was attacked?

At first, you may think so. However, you then consider that you are in a courtroom situation and the man is trying to convince you that he was attacked.

How do you know if you believe him because he is speaking truth and not just because he is persuasive?

It is possible that the man is lying, but is persuasive enough to convince you to believe him.

Also, is the evidence that this man uses to convince you conclusive? You did not see the attack for yourself and the evidence given may have been faked.

So, you don't actually know that the man was attacked. All you have is a belief without good reasons to doubt it, that accidentally turns out to be true.

2 The Theaetetus - Socrates as the Midwife of Ideas

In the Theaetetus, Socrates likens himself to a midwife that draws out people's ideas and tests them to see if they stand to reason, while never putting forward his own ideas.

Socrates, in this dialogue, criticises all of Theaetetus' proposed accounts of knowledge.

By the end of the dialogue, all we know is that we do not know how to account for knowledge, with not positive account of knowledge proposed by Plato.

It is a signature of the Platonic tradition to also constantly question others' claims and never make ones for themselves. This, according to some, is how we should be seeking truth - by questioning and not claiming.

However, positive and ambitious claims are made in other dialogues. So, some take the Theaetetus to be Plato arguing against views of knowledge that he thought were wrong.

3 Referring to Plato's Works

In 1578, Henri Etienne[Stephanus] printed Plato's works for the first time in Paris. When citing Plato's works, we refer to the page number where that specific text appeared in Stephanus' first printed edition, as well as letters, from "a" to "e", that divide each page in Stephanus' edition into five sections.

For example, Stephanus numbers would go like, "200e", "45a", etc..

4 Methods of Transferring Knowledge - The Jury's Problem

4.1 Unreliable Methods - Persuasion

Plato proposed that the reason you didn't have knowledge of the man being attacked is because he was persuading you of that belief and his aim was to do so.

You could have easily been persuaded of a falsehood as you were of the truth.

So, the way in which your belief was acquired was unreliable as it could produce falsehood as well as truth.

If we can't know that our belief is true, as the way in which we got them is unreliable, then we do not have knowledge of that belief.

4.2 Types of Beliefs and Methods

Plato also proposed that that the type of belief that I would be persuaded of, that the man was robbed, must be acquired by direct experience to have knowledge of.

Since we are only getting a second-hand account from the man, and not directly experiencing it like he did, we cannot have knowledge of the event.

While this standard is usually deemed too high, it does tell us something important: that others cannot know things for us.

While the way we get beliefs will vary based on the type of belief it is, what will always be true is that we must be the ones getting the belief and not someone else doing so for us, in order for us to have knowledge of that belief.

4.3 A Conflict of Proposals

However, there seems to be a conflict between both of Plato's proposals.

The first proposal, that the reason we didn't have knowledge is because of an unreliable method, seems to suppose that it is possible for knowledge to be conveyed, just that persuasion does not allow for this.

The second proposal, that the reason we didn't have knowledge is because the type of belief must be experienced directly, seems to suppose that knowledge simply cannot be transferred, and the only way to acquire it is to get it yourself.

4.3.1 A Deeper Look

While it may seem that Plato here is contradicting himself, we have good reason to think that this is not the case.

First, Plato is never trying to make positive claims in this dialogue, bit only trying to question others'. So, it doesn't matter if his objections to claims conflict. All that tells us is that when we try to make a positive account of knowledge, we should be aware of these two issues.

Second, Plato was likely aware of this contradiction, due to the high level of thought in the Theaetetus.

4.3.2 Recollection

In the Meno, Plato claims that knowledge can be taught.

Socrates tries to teach a boy Geometry and explains to him the proofs. After, Socrates says that the boy has a true belief about Geometry.

Only once people start asking the boy about the subject and the boy thinks them through, will he have knowledge about Geometry.

Socrates taught the boy knowledge of Geometry by enabling him to have knowledge about it by giving him true beliefs about it. Yet only the boy can have knowledge if he puts in the effort for himself.

Thus, knowledge can be conveyed, but only if the subject who gains knowledge tries to do so for himself.

Plato calls this process Recollection and says that this is the soul recollecting knowledge that it had before embodiment.

4.3.3 A High Standard

However, we will notice that knowledge of Geometry is not the same as the type of knowledge in the Jury's Problem.

Knowledge of Geometry is abstract and doesn't require direct experience like knowledge that the man was attacked does, as the latter is more concrete.

Thus, Plato's standard of knowledge is higher than most people's and he usually concludes that many things we think we know we do not in fact know.

4.4 Plato's Style of Argumentation

Plato writes in a way that uses rigorous argumentation to support his position and to critique others', and have the reader carefully consider the arguments provided.

5 Theory of Forms

Plato is the originator of his Theory of Forms. While we are never given and explicit exposition of these, we see traces of this concept in many of his writings, with it being more explicit in some.

6 How to Approach Plato

It is important to read Plato with an awareness that he does make positive claims, while also understanding that sometimes he does solely engage with the reader and merely questions claims. Neither of this should be emphasised, as Plato does both.

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Conclusion

The next post in the Plato: A Very Short Introduction series will be on Chapter 2: Plato's Name and Other Matters.

To buy Plato: A Very Short Introduction:

https://www.amazon.com/Plato-Short-Introduction-Julia-Annas/dp/019280216X

Notes: Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide: Chapter 1: Perception

 Notes: Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide: Chapter 1: Perception

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Purpose

This is the first post in the Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide notes series, on Chapter 1: Perception:

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Content:

1 Introduction

2 Knowledge of the External World

2.1 Dream Argument

2.2 Cartesian Demon

2.3 Brain-in-a-vat Argument

3 Perception-reality Gap

3.1 Rationalism

3.2 Cogito Ergo Sum

3.3 Indirect Realism

3.3.1 Argument from the Indiscernability of Veridical and Hallucinatory Experiences

3.3.2 Argument from Process

3.3.3 Argument from Delay

3.3.4 General Argument for Indirect Realism

4 Skepticism

4.1 Skepticism and Indirect Realism

4.2 Explanatory Power

4.3 Answering Skepticism

4.3.1 Descartes' Response

4.3.2 Contemporary Responses

4.3.3 Ockham's Razor

4.3.3.1 Ockham's Razor and Skeptical Hypotheses

5 The Mind-Body Problem

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1 Introduction

Let us begin by asking a question: how do I know that I am truly reading this, and that I do not merely think that I am doing so, while not in fact doing so?

Rene Descartes[1596 - 1650] asked the same question.

A possible answer to that question could be that it is obvious that we are truly reading this .We can see and even feel and smell whatever is around us while we are reading this. Since our senses tell us so, there is no reason to doubt that we are truly reading this right now.

However, if the source of our information is unreliable, then we are not truly justified in believing that information. For example, say that we have a friend who is a notorious liar. If he were to tell us something, even if it were true, he is unreliable, so we are not justified in believing whatever he told us. Therefore, we do not have knowledge of that thing in question.

2 Knowledge of the External World

The above situation has been likened to our senses telling us things. Our senses tell us all that we know about the external world. However, there are many instances that we know of where they deceive us.

Descartes presented two thought experiments to argue for the fact that our senses were unreliable.

2.1 Dream Argument

First, Descartes pointed out that while we are dreaming, our senses tell us that we are actually awake and doing things that we are not.

How could we then know if we were not sleeping right now, and our senses merely telling us that we are doing something else?

Whatever evidence that you could appeal to to counter such a question would ultimately be part of the dream itself, and therefore unreliable, and possibly untrue. For example, you may appeal to the memory of past dreams to show that this experience is unlike those. Therefore, this cannot be a dream. However, these memories that you have of past dreams could be untrue and made up in the dream itself. What if this is how all your past dreams felt? And only this time does your dream deceive you into thinking that that is not the case.

You couldn't know. For nothing in your experiences themselves let you know whether or not they are real.

2.2 Cartesian Demon

Descartes also presented the famous Cartesian Demon thought experiment, where he pointed out that it was completely possible that you were just a disembodied mind[without a brain] and the only other thing in existence was an evil demon, whose only goal was to deceive you into thinking that the external world existed. 

As for the dream argument, any possible evidence that you could appeal to to refute this claim would come from the possibly demon, and therefore be possibly untrue. We simply could not know.

2.3 Brain-in-a-vat Argument

A modern illustration of Descartes point would be the brain-in-a-vat argument.

You sensations depend on processes in our brains, based on external input. For example, light has to stimulate your eyes for you to see. 

It is possible that your experiences could be simulated by artificial input. Maybe you were just a brain in a vat that was being artificially stimulated by scientists in a lab.

Once again, any evidence you could appeal to to deny this claim would ultimately come from the scientists, if this scenario were true, and therefore would be unreliable, and untrue. We could not know for sure.

3 Perception-reality Gap

Descartes thought that the arguments above showed that there was a gap between our perception and what is real.

What we experience is not necessarily what is real.

3.1 Rationalism

Descartes did not think that this meant that we could not know things for certain, just that whatever we could know from certain could not come from our perception or senses.

This lead Descartes to oppose the view of Empiricism, the view that all our knowledge ultimately comes from our senses.

He held that all our knowledge must come from something other than our senses: pure reason operating independently of the senses. This view is called Rationalism.

3.2 Cogito Ergo Sum

Descartes did think that we could know things for absolute certain.

He believed that the first thing that you could know is that you existed.

For even if you were being deceived by your senses, and you were worried about the possibility of such, you would first have to exist in order to be worried or even think about this.

Hence, Descartes famous, "Cogito ergo sum", "I think, therefore I am". To think is to show that you are, that you exist.

3.3 Indirect Realism

Even if we could know that we existed, could we know anything else, like whether the external world existed?

Descartes thought so, and that we could know this external world, just not directly.

He held that all that we have direct access to is our experiences, regardless of whether what depicted in those experiences were real or not.

Hence, when we see a pen, we are not seeing the pen directly, but are seeing a "pen-ish" representation of it in our minds.

We are said to see the pen indirectly, through our perception of it.

The view that we are only ever immediately aware of our perception and not what we are perceiving is called indirect realism, also known as representative realism, or causal realism.

Indirect realism is a form of realism because it holds that the external world does exist.

Yet it is called indirect as we are not said to know this world directly.

3.3.1 Argument from the Indiscernability of Veridical and Hallucinatory Experiences

One argument for indirect realism comes from the fact that our experiences themselves cannot tell us that what we are experiencing is real.

A veridical experience[an experience in which what we are experiencing is real] is as subjectively real to us as a hallucination.

However, in the hallucination, what we are experiencing cannot be real, yet we experience the same thing in both the veridical and hallucinatory cases.

Thus, what we are experiencing in both cases must not be the things themselves, but perceptions of them in our mind, perceptions that are common to both veridical and hallucinatory cases.

3.3.2 Argument from Process

Another argument for indirect realism comes from the fact that there are a long chain of causal relations between what we experience and the experience of them ourselves.

For example, to see a pen, light will have to bounce off the pen and into our eyes, and our eyes have to send an electrical signal to our brains, then a long process must occur in the brain to finally form our perception of the pen. 

With such a long causal gap between perceptual representation of a thing and the thing itself, our awareness of the thing must be indirect, more likely through one of the members of the causal process and not the thing itself.

3.3.3 Argument from Delay

One more argument for indirect realism comes from the fact that the causal process mentioned above takes time to occur.

The light that allows us to see things takes time to move, causing a delay in the process.

This delay is insignificant when considering short distances.

However, consider a larger scale: say, our perception of the sun. The light from the sun takes 8 minutes to reach our eyes. This means that the sun that we see does not exist anymore, but is the one from 8 minutes ago.

Therefore, we cannot be directly aware of the sun, or other things we see, as our perceptual representations of them are of the older versions of those things than the ones that currently exist.

So, our awareness of such things must be indirect.

3.3.4 General Argument for Indirect Realism

The general argument for indirect realism can be summarised as such:

1) it is possible to cause a hallucination that is subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical experiences.[such as by stimulating a brain]

2) if the effects of veridical and hallucinatory experiences are the same[what we directly know], then the immediate causes of veridical and hallucinatory experiences must be the same too

3) for hallucinations, the effect is a subjective perceptual experience

4) so, for veridical experiences, since they are identical to hallucinations, they must also be the effect of a subjective perceptual experience

4 Skepticism

4.1 Skepticism and Indirect Realism

Some philosophers have held indirect realism to be problematic as they thought that indirect realism would inevitably lead to skepticism about the external world.

Skepticism is a view that questions that possibility of knowledge about a thing.

So, skepticism about the external world would question whether or not we could know the external world.

The reason why indirect realism leads to skepticism is because if we are never directly aware of the external world, then we are not justified in thinking that it exists.

4.2 Explanatory Power

However, all views have skeptical implications.

Skepticism comes from the logical possibility that your perceptions and reality are not aligned.

Indirect Realism seems to have an advantage over Direct Realism in accounting for the possibility of skepticism.

If we only directly know our perception and not the external world directly, it isn't surprising that they do not align, as they are separate things.

However, if we are directly aware of the external world, it is surprising that we cannot tell the difference between veridical and non-veridical experiences, as they should be very different on this view.

So, Indirect Realism may have more explanatory power than Direct Realism, in accounting for skepticism.

4.3 Answering Skepticism

4.3.1 Descartes' Response

Descartes held that the existence of God, that he argued for separately, could account for skepticism.

This is because he thought that a perfectly good God would not deceive us in general.

So, we would have good reason to think that we are not currently being deceived and what we perceive is what is real.

However, contemporary responses do not need to make use of the existence of God, especially since it is a controversial topic, and in philosophy, we should try our best to eschew from using controversial solutions to controversial problems.

4.3.2 Contemporary Responses

Many contemporary philosophers hold that skepticism can be answered if we note that the belief that our perception aligns with reality is similar to a scientific hypothesis.

They then argue that this hypothesis is the best explanation of all our experiences and is confirmed by successful predictions based on it.

A similar way of reasoning occurs when we affirm the existence of electrons. Though we cannot directly experience these electrons, like by seeing them, we are rationally justified in thinking they exist as their existence is a well-supported hypothesis.

Similarly, we are justified in believing in the existence of the external world even though we cannot directly experience it.

4.3.3 Ockham's Razor

Ochkam's Razor is a principle of scientific explanation that states that we should favour simpler hypotheses that stay closer to the evidence, asks less further questions and assumes less.

4.3.3.1 Ockham's Razor and Skeptical Hypotheses

Ockham's Razor may be said to prefer the cartesian demon hypothesis over the realist view.

This may be because one might say that the cartesian demon hypothesis is simpler and only posits the demon and you, while the realist view is more complex and posits an entire world with complex laws and systems.

However, skeptical hypotheses, like the cartesian demon hypothesis, turn out to be more complex than realist hypotheses.

This is because they assume the realist view then add another entity.

For example, in the cartesian demon hypothesis, it posits not only the existence of the demon and me, but whatever is in the realist hypothesis, as the realist hypothesis must be simulated to be true for me to be deceived to believe it.

Also, the cartesian demon would have to be complex enough to be able to deceive me and simulate the realist view. The demon would have to be aware of its goals and one would also have to ask why it has the goals it has, and not some other.

The same is similar for all other skeptical scenarios.

Thus, Ockam's Razor will always favour realist hypotheses, as compared to skeptical hypotheses.

5 The Mind-Body Problem

From what we have considered so far, there seems to be a gap between reality and our perception.

This gap not only has epistemological implications, but metaphysical ones as well.

We have qualia: sensory perceptions[taste, smell, feel, touch, sound] that are unique to the mind. A pan may get hot, but it never feels hot. But you can get burnt by the pan.

These qualia form a unified and coherent representation of the world, and do not come to us as random messes of information.

They are said to have intentionality: the property of being about or representing or directed at something. For example, the word "dog" has intentionality as it is about real dogs and has meaning, not being a mere random unintelligible strand of words.

We are also consciously aware of this representation of the world given to us by qualia and can rationally consider it and its implications, meanings and significance.

Qualia, unified conscious experience, rationality and intentionality all come together to form a subject that can experience the world from a first-person perspective, or a subjective point of view.

However, science tells us that all this reduces to unthinking and unfeeling matter and natural processes.

This conflict between what science tells us our mind is and what it seems to be leads to the mind-body problem, and all issues in philosophy of mind ultimately go back to the mind-body problem.

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Conclusion

The next post in the Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide series will be on Chapter 2: Dualism.

Purchase Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide:

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