Omnipotence and Paradox

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It's sometimes claimed that God's omnipotence is logically impossible because of certain paradoxes that one could come up with. Such an attempt to show that some of God's attributes, as classically conceived, are logically inconsistent, either in and of themselves or with each other, is usually said to challenge the coherence of theism. If such coherence of theism objections are successful, then the very project of natural theology is useless, as it would be the same thing as arguing for a square circle or thing with shape but no colour -- it would be a waste of time.

In this article, I will give my thoughts on a famous omnipotence paradox, that tries to show that the very concept of all-power is self-contradictory.

1 Could God Create a Stone So Heavy That He Couldn't Lift?

A common omnipotence paradox that atheists use asks if God could make a rock so heavy that He could not lift. This leaves the theist with a seemingly unsolvable dilemma, of which either horn results in the incoherence of theism.

If the theist answered yes, then God would no longer be omnipotent, as He would be impotent to lift the rock that He created.

If the theist answered no, then God would also no longer be omnipotent, as He would be impotent to create even a rock!

This, the atheist would then claim, would lead us to conclude that the idea of a being being omnipotent allows for paradoxes and situations where the being would be both omnipotent and not omnipotent, meaning that it is an incoherent notion that can't actually exist.

2 Omnipotence

However, I would argue that the above paradox, and many other similar ones, operate on an understanding of omnipotence that many theists, maybe except Descartes, would not accept, and one that the majority of theists have historically rejected: namely that omnipotence is the ability to do anything and everything, including logically impossible acts.

But most theists would approach omnipotence with more nuance, saying instead that omnipotence is the ability to do anything that is logically consistent.

This isn't an ad hoc attempt to overcome omnipotence paradoxes as well, but follows from further philosophical reflection.

2.1 Nonsensical Statements

The reason why an omnipotent being would not be able to do a logically impossible action is because, upon further reflection, one realises that logically impossible actions do not and cannot exist. So, for an omnipotent being to do a logically impossible action would be for them not to act at all, as they would not be doing anything.

This is because descriptions of logically impossible actions, like to walk and not walk at the same time or to sit and stand at the same time, do not actually describe anything, the same way the action of "elevening the proposition "hello"" does not describe, or refer to, anything -- it's nonsensical.

Such a form of reasoning is also applied to solve other paradoxes, like the liar paradox. For example, Michael Huemer, an agnostic regarding the existence of God, argues that the proposition, P, "P is false", does not actually refer to anything, so the paradox does not actually exist. How Dr. Huemer argues for this position in the context of the liar's paradox is not important, but goes to show that the line of reasoning that I'm employing here is perfectly legitimate and isn't just a last-ditch effort to salvage theism.

2.2 Conclusion of Omnipotence

So, omnipotence is the ability to perform all logically consistent acts, as logically inconsistent or impossible acts cannot be done, or actualised, since they don't even describe any action in a meaningful sense at all.

This means that the inability to perform logically impossible actions does not show that a being is weak, as such actions do not even possibly exist for that being to do, and to do them is equivalent to doing nothing, which all beings can do.

3 Applying Omnipotence to Omnipotence Paradoxes

With this more nuanced view of omnipotence in place, let us see how we can apply it to the paradox of the rock.

I would argue that God indeed cannot make a rock so heavy that He cannot lift, but not because He isn't omnipotent, but because such an action is logically impossible.

As the proponent of the paradox notes, it results in God being both omnipotent and not omnipotent, which would result in a logical contradiction. Following our definition of omnipotence, this would mean that such an action is as nonsensical as the action of "purpling the number ten", and therefore, in principle, cannot be done.

The inability to perform such an action also does nothing to affect God's omnipotence, as such an action does not even exist and our description of it amounts to an unintelligible string of words. The same way us describing the action of  "festgyywtqefa" is unintelligible and one's inability to do it does not reflect upon their capabilities in any way.

4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the paradox of the rock does not pose a challenge to the notion of omnipotence, as such an action results in a logical contradiction, meaning that, according to theists, God would not be able to perform such an action. This does not affect His omnipotence in any way, since logically contradictory actions are not actions at all, and therefore cannot be done.

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A Critique of Brute Facts as Explanation

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Maybe there really isn't a need for an absolutely simple being, as deduced from stage one of the Argument from Composition. Why can't it be what is called a brute fact that accounts for composite beings? This article will have me briefly discuss my thoughts on such an objection. I won't be repeating the Argument from Composition here, so it's recommended that one takes a look at the original article.

Also, while my comments here are specifically targeted towards the use of brute facts as an objection towards the Argument from Composition, the same could be said for the use of brute facts as an objection to anything at all.

In the context of the Argument from Composition, one might object that it's merely a brute fact that composite beings exist and that their parts are composed in this specific manner, needing no explanation.

1 Brute Facts

Brute facts are facts that don't have any explanations, but just are. For example, some atheists may claim that the existence of the universe is a brute fact, requiring no further explanation. Or some theistic personalists may claim that the existence of God and His attributes, on their model, are just brute facts.

2 Non-explanations

One issue with using such an approach to argue for or against a position is that to say that something is a brute fact to explain a fact is, by definition, no explanation at all. In the end, the one positing something as a brute fact in order to account for it has just admitted that they have not given any explanation or account of the fact in question.

So, they should accept the original account of the fact in question, in this case, the absolutely simple being, until they provide an alternative explanation or refute the arguments that the advocate of the Argument from Composition has put forward.

If not, it seems to me to be simply question begging to not engage with the arguments while asserting that your position is simply true.

3 Good Hypothesis?

Further, as alluded to above, the existence of brute facts in one's hypothesis affects its viability, as compared to opposing hypotheses.

A hypothesis is just a proposed explanation for a phenomenon. In more colloquial, albeit inaccurate, terms, it could be said to be a theory, of sorts, to account for a certain set of facts.

While the philosophy of science is not something that I've read much into, I am aware that when assessing the validity and plausibility of a hypothesis, simplicity and ad hocness are important factors.

3.1 Simplicity

A hypothesis is simpler when it proposes fewer entities and explanatory mechanisms to account for more facts.

For example, the hypothesis that there were nine unobserved planets orbiting somewhere out in space to explain the slightly skewed orbit of an observed planet would be less simple than the hypothesis that there were just one planet orbiting somewhere. Of course, this is given that both the former and latter hypotheses adequately account for the data.

3.2 Ad Hocness

A hypothesis is less ad hoc when it proposes less random or unnecessary entities and explanatory mechanisms, staying within the given data as far as it can.

For example, when trying to explain a murder. It would be ad hoc to say that there was a fairy in the room when the murder was committed, as this goes beyond the evidence and observations, and is random, as well as unnecessary.

3.3 Bruteness

According to the above criteria, positing unjustified brute facts as part of one's hypothesis would be ad hoc and make the hypothesis less simple.

Consider that I bake a cake and leave it out to cool, and when I return the cake is gone, while only an empty tray remains. Let us now consider two hypotheses. First, that the cake was eaten by my brother, who has done this many times in the past. Second, that it is a brute fact that the cake would disappear on that day, at that time, and that the cake that would disappear would be the one that I specifically baked.

The second hypothesis is far less simple than the first. At first, one may think that it is simpler because the first hypothesis posits my brother while the second does not.

However, upon further reflection, we realise that the first hypothesis posits my brother, who we already know is likely to do such a thing, and that cakes usually don't disappear randomly. The first hypothesis very nicely accounts for all of our background information while only positing one entity and explanatory mechanism, my brother, and maybe his hunger.

But the second hypothesis is far less simple and more ad hoc since it assumes that out of all possible times, and completely contrary to all past experience, my specific cake would disappear at that specific time on that specific day. The explanatory mechanism here is extremely ad hoc and violates all of our background knowledge about cakes and causation and what not. And its simplicity also takes a huge hit from this as we're positing a lot more that goes beyond the data[that at this specific time, on this specific day, my specific cake would disappear]: many more things would have to align perfectly for this hypothesis.

So, we should favour the first hypothesis as it is more simple and less ad hoc, until extra evidence and argument is given for the second hypothesis or arguments for the first are refuted.

3.4 Science

It would also be profitable to note that the explanatory principles that I bring up above are commonly used in not only the philosophy of science but science itself, and without them scientists would have a lot of trouble coming to any substantive conclusions based on their experiments.

For example, take our discovery that the local universe started to exist approximately 26.7 billion years ago. In order to come to such a conclusion, we not only had to gather data, such as detecting the cosmic microwave background radiation, or to ascertain that the universe really was expanding, but also had to come up with hypotheses that could explain this data.

Now, using explanatory principles like how close a hypothesis stays to the data and having it be less ad hoc, we managed to find that the best explanation of this data is that the universe began to exist 26.7 billion years ago.

Using these explanatory principles, we could also rule out more ad hoc and less simple hypotheses like that the speed of light changed and the universe was really 6000 years old, or that all these observations were just brute facts that had no explanation. If scientists gave countenance to the latter, then science as we know it would end.

4 Conclusion

In conclusion, positing brute facts as an explanation for a given phenomena, especially without sufficient justification, serves as a non-explanation and can be shown to have, in light of certain inductive and explanatory principles used in science, to be rejected in favour of other hypotheses that do serve as a better explanation. While this does not necessarily ascertain the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, it is the best way that we can go about handling data that we have.

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A Critique of the Argument from Desire

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This article will lay out my thoughts and critiques of the Argument from Desire, whose most popular proponent is the great C.S. Lewis, but has found defenders from many different Christian traditions in history, with St. Thomas Aquinas being one famous example, with Edward Feser and Peter Kreeft being more contemporary examples.

Before I begin, let me qualify the fact that I haven't read deeply into the Argument from Desire, so my critiques here may not hold up when confronted with a more informed version of the argument. My main sources here are Edward Feser's blog post Arguments from Desire, Peter Kreeft's article on the argument and the C.S. Lewis Institute's digital handout on the argument. I will mostly be engaging with these three sources in this article, so it's recommended that one thoroughly reads these three before reading this, as I don't go into as much detail as they do, in explicating the argument.

1 The Argument from Desire

First, let me lay out the argument itself, before I start to give my thoughts on it.

The argument can be put in such a syllogism:

P1 every innate desire that we have has a corresponding thing that can satisfy it

P2 we have an innate desire that no limited creature in time and space can satisfy

P3 therefore, there is something unlimited, that is outside of time and space that can satisfy this innate desire

P4 this is what we call God

P5 therefore, God exists

1.1 Innate and External Desires

Kreeft makes a distinction between innate desires and external desires.

Innate desires, also called natural desires, are desires that are "built into" a person. As Feser articulates, such desires are essential to the person, and not just accidental. For example, the desire for food is of the essence of a person, it is built into the human nature. Thirst, the desire for water or drink, is also essential.

External desires are more so accidental and are as such circumstantial. For example, as Kreeft says, the desire to have a sportscar is not innate or natural to us.

This distinction is important to the argument, since the first premise only applies to innate desires and not external desires. This means that just because we desire a sportscar, it doesn't necessarily exist.

1.2 Conclusion of the Argument

The argument then concludes that there exists an unlimited, transcendent, timeless and spaceless object that corresponds to our innate desire for it.

As Kreeft admits, this object isn't the traditionally-conceived God of the monotheistic religions, but a mysterious force that draws us nearer to it, that can satisfy our deepest, most transcendent desires.

Also, as one may have realised, the Argument from Desire is considered a teleological argument, as there is a sort of "ordering towards" involved in this argument.

2 General Critique

With the basic argument in place, let me start to critique it.

2.1 Why Think Innate?

The first problem that I can see for this argument is that no proper justification is given for the claim that our desire for something transcendent and immaterial is truly an innate desire, as opposed to an external desire.

If anything, I'd argue that our desire for something transcendent is much more like an external desire, as opposed to an innate desire, just off the examples that Kreeft, Feser and Art give in their treatments of the argument.

While an innate desire usually is something that we require for our being, like food or water, an external desire is something that we don't need to get.

And if one were to argue that we this deep feeling within us truly has to be fulfilled, showing that it's more like an innate desire, I would point out that such a line of reasoning is far too subjective for any atheist to accept.

2.2 Evolution and the Physical

My second objection to this argument is that it seems to ignore evolutionary theory. I'm not the most learned on biology, but I'm at least informed enough to know that the theory of evolution tells us that complex lifeforms and human beings came about by natural selection and random mutations. At least this is the core of evolutionary theory.

This would mean that our desires came about by evolutionary processes of natural selection and random mutation. Since this is a physical process, then, in principle, any object of desire that our faculties of desire would have evolved to desire would be physical. So, we could not possibly desire anything transcendent, immaterial or timeless, as the process that caused our desires would not allow for it.

Now, of course I do not think that evolution was a random and unguided process, but a process with innate teleology, guided by a creator. But the project of natural theology, as Richard Swinburne notes, must begin with premises that both the theist and atheist will accept. So, our arguments should either avoid the theory of evolution or account for it, as most atheists accept it as an unguided process.

2.3 Evolution and Explanation

My third objection is also related to evolution, which I think could give a more plausible account of our innate desire for transcendence. Since I have already given a basic explanation of evolution and what it proposes in the previous section, I will not do so again.

I think that a better explanation for why we desire the transcendent would be for survival. Let me give an example to better illustrate my point here. An example that Feser gives of an innate desire that is transcendent is our desire for life after death. And, according to the Argument from Desire, this means that immortality is, in principle, achievable.

I think that it's far more likely that we desire immortality because desiring immortality and to live on will motivate us to survive, so we evolved this desire.

The same could be said for happiness or joy, that seems to be transcendent, it promotes survival as it allows us to want to continue to live on or to reproduce and take care of our children, as we love our spouse and offspring. So, we evolved this desire.

The same line of reasoning could be said for basically every instance of our desire for the transcendent, and, given my second objection, such alternative explanations will be far more likely.

Now, I am a theist and do really believe that such desires for God and joy and love really do have significance and meaning, but I just don't think that this can be shown using the Argument from Desire alone.

2.4 Mind the Gap

My fourth objection would be the gap problem. Even as Kreeft admits, the object of transcendent desires is not like the God of classical monotheistic religions. We cannot deduce that it is all-good, all-powerful or all-knowing, among other things.

So why think that this is a successful argument for the existence of God? Unless we can show that this object has such properties, the atheist can rightfully say that we have not yet succeeded in proving what we wanted to prove, allowing the atheist to maintain their atheism.

2.5 Conclusion of Critique

In conclusion, while I agree with the conclusion of the Argument from Desire, I think that it works on premises that an atheist, and indeed maybe even a theist, would reject, and therefore is unsuccessful and shouldn't be used until one can overcome the challenges that I have proposed here.

3 Suggestions

However, I don't think that the argument, as I have presented here, is completely unsalvageable. I think that it could be reformulated to argue instead that theism best explains such transcendent desires, as opposed to atheism, as worldviews. Of course, one would have to overcome my third critique, but I have a few rebuttals in mind. For example, maybe we don't really need to love our spouse in order to reproduce. Why not just purely see them as a sexual object? Such lines of reasoning could be employed.

Further, my evolutionary debunking arguments, as they are called, could be weakened if one were to use C.S. Lewis' Argument from Reason, an argument that I actually think is good and will defend in future.

While this new argument wouldn't be the exact same argument, it's in the spirit of the original, and one that I think C.S. Lewis would endorse.

4 Use

I do still think that the Argument from Desire illustrates a powerful point: that we do desire something transcendent and that our intuitions tell us that this desire is very, very real.

While I don't think that it's necessarily successful as an argument, I think that it's successful in exposing our desire for God and that we truly aren't complete without Him, which may help motivate one to search for Him.

5 Conclusion

While I may not find the argument particularly convincing, it can certainly be tweaked a bit to serve as evidence in favour of theism and can encourage someone to seek God for themself.

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Notes: The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics: Part I: Foundations, Chapter 1: Introduction

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 Notes: The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics: Part I: Foundations, Chapter 1: Introduction

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Purpose

This is the first post in the The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics notes series, on Part I: Foundations, Chapter 1: Introduction.

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Content:

1 What is Metaphysics?

2 A Brief History of Metaphysics
2.1 Beginning of Metaphysics
2.2 Hellenistic Period
2.3 Late Antiquity
2.4 17th and 18th Centuries
2.5 Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries
2.6 20th Century
2.7 21st Century

3 Is Metaphysics Useless?
3.1 Skeptical Objection
3.2 Pragmatist Objection
3.2.1 Fatalism
3.2.2 Causation
3.2.3 Science
3.2.4 Mind-Body Problem
3.2.5 Identity

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1 What is Metaphysics?

Metaphysics studies the nature of ultimate reality. It is also called first philosophy.

The most fundamental aspects of reality are studied by Metaphysics, like existence, parts and wholes, space and time, causality, possibility and necessity, similarity and dissimilarity, etc..

2 A Brief History of Metaphysics

Metaphysics is the oldest branch of philosophy.

2.1 Beginnings of Metaphysics

The pre-socratic philosophers of Ionia and Southern Italy proposed metaphysical theories of change.

Materialism was held by early philosophers like Empedocles and Democritus, with their Atomism, etc..

In response to this, Plato developed his Theory of Forms as an alternative to these materialistic philosophies. His student, Aristotle, built on Plato's work to develop the first full systematic metaphysics. Both of them rejected materialism and emphasised the qualitative features of reality.

Both Plato and Aristotle founded schools, the Academy and the Lyceum, respectively, to carry on their philosophy.

2.2 Hellenestic Period

During the Hellenestic Period[the time between the conquests of Alexander the Great and the rise of Rome], three schools of philosophy arose: Stoicism, Epicureanism and Skepticism. The Stoics and Epicureans supported a materialistic philosophy. Then, Metaphysics became less popular, while more work was done in Ethics, Politics and Epistemology, as people focused on defending the possibility of knowledge from the Skeptics. Plato's Academy were moderate skeptics during this time.

2.3 Late Antiquity

During the Late Antiquity, Christians, Jews and Muslims were the main ones doing philosophy. Metaphysics became popular again and Aristotle's works were becoming more influential due to more translation of them being done and spread. Out of this period came Scholasticism and was dominant for centuries.

2.4 17th and 18th Centuries

During the 17th and 18th centuries, materialism regained popularity as modern science was seen to be successful, and it worked on a materialistic philosophy.

Rene Descartes reintroduced the problem of skepticism, renewing the focus of defending the possibility of knowledge. Descartes solution to skepticism was to build knowledge on an indubitable foundation: the mind and self, leading to the rise of Idealism, the idea that the most fundamental reality is the mental. Idealism was popular for a centuries.

2.5 Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

During the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, for a brief time, Metaphysics was rejected by many philosophers. This was because studies in psychology and culture had shown that external and internal societal and psychological factors impacted the conclusions of metaphysics, rendering metaphysics too relative and therefore useless.

So, extreme empiricism, or Verificationism, was common, the view that all assertions must be verifiable or falsifiable by the senses to be meaningful. This made metaphysics seem useless.

The ability of metaphysicians to analyse the grammar and logic of language was also criticised, further attacking metaphysic's viability.

However, during the 20th century, interest in metaphysics was revived.

2.6 20th Century

During the 20th century, many started to reject Idealism and argue that skepticism did not need to be answered. G.E. Moore argued that knowledge of the external world is more rationally justified than any skepticism. Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that skepticism required justification but lacked it.

Many philosophers during this time also argued that science required no justification except for empirical observation.

So, Metaphysics regained popularity as people now wanted to study the external world. As such, traditional metaphysical schools regained popularity, such as Materialism, Platonism, Scholasticism and Aristotelianism.

In the Philosophy of Science, philosophers of physics explored the nature of space, time, causation and their underlying structures.

In the Philosophy of Language, philosophers studying the logical structure of language were lead to ask metaphysical questions of ontology.

In Logic, logicians were lead to ask metaphysical questions of modality and time.

2.7 21st Century

By the beginning of the 21st century, Metaphysics was the most prominent field of philosophy once more.

3 Is Metaphysics Useless?

There are two main objections to the study of Metaphysics.

3.1 Skeptical Objection

The first objection is a skeptical objection: that we cannot achieve knowledge with Metaphysics.

To respond to this objection, one should just do metaphysics to show the skeptic that we can get knowledge from it.

3.2 Pragmatist Objection

The second objection is a pragmatist objection: that Metaphysics is not important, as compared to other fields of philosophy like Ethics and Epistemology.

The first response would be to note that metaphysics comes naturally from a curiosity about the world, from which philosophy itself originates. So, metaphysics is a necessary by-product of philosophical inquiry and wonder.

The second response would be to note that metaphysics is deeply relevant to many other areas of philosophy, like Axiology, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.

3.2.1 Fatalism

In Ethics, it is important to ask whether or not we really do have free will. What if Fatalism is true and we do not really have free choices, then we would not have moral responsibility. Metaphysics can help answer this question, as it relates to modality and other metaphysical fields of inquiry.

If Fatalism were true, then it would also have many implications on our lives and meaning.

3.2.2 Causation

In Ethics and Epistemology, it's important to ask if we can causally impact the future. If not, then we would have no moral responsibility or even knowledge, as our knowledge would merely come accidentally and not be causally influenced by facts, making it hard to achieve justification for our beliefs. Metaphysics can help to answer this question.

3.2.3 Science

Science presupposes many metaphysical propositions that can only be justified by metaphysics, that relate to modality, fundamentality, ontology and space and time, contrary to scientists that assume that science has made Metaphysics useless.

3.2.4 Mind-Body Problem

In the Philosophy of Mind, we have the mind-body problem, that asks us how do we reconcile what we seem to know about our mind and what science tells us about it. Metaphysics can help a lot in attempts to solve the mind-body problem.

3.2.5 Identity

Do we retain identity over time? If not, then the meaning of our lives would be significantly impacted. This question is answered using metaphysics, relating to composition.

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Conclusion

The next post in the The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics notes series will be on Part I: Foundations, Chapter 2: Truthmakers.

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What's This?

This will be a short article where I explain the purpose of this blog and clarify what I want and do not want to do with every article or note post that I publish here.

1 Purpose

Originally, I intended this not to be a blog but a database where I store my philosophy notes for easy personal reference. But I soon realised how much I enjoyed writing, as well as how beneficial writing was to my own understanding of various concepts and arguments.

So, I started writing articles and expositions of my understanding of various different arguments and philosophies, and will continue to do so, along side my notes[which I want to focus on since my main goal now is learning].

2 Interests

I'm heavily interested in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and philosophy of religion, but don't mind dabbling in other areas of philosophy. Indeed, philosophy of religion usually ends up requiring one to go far beyond what they originally intended.

I also enjoy the general history of philosophy and seeing what we can learn from the thought of previous thinkers, whatever their philosophical views were. If I agree with them, then I will try to understand why. If I do not, then I will try to see if I can continue to reasonably do so.

3 Intention

It's also important for me to mention that I don't necessarily hold to everything that I write here. I'm willing to write about anything, even if I don't hold to that specific position.

For example, I just recently, as of the time that I am writing this article, finished writing articles about my understanding of the Argument from Composition. I plan to write some rebuttals to objections that I have heard that I don't think are successful, but I also plan to write some critiques of the argument. I also don't even necessarily think that the argument is successful.

4 Conclusion

This blog will be where I write articles about philosophical[and maybe theological] topics and keep my notes for books that I read, specifically books that advertise themselves as "textbooks".

I don't necessarily hold to the views that I write about as well, since I write about everything that I find interesting, so as to improve my own understanding of the views.

Does Everything Have a Cause?

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This will be a short but important article, in which I will merely be repeating something that theistic philosophers have been for about two decades now, in response to new atheist strawmen of cosmological arguments for the existence of God. This will also hopefully help set the stage for the various cosmological arguments that can be found on this blog.

1 Cosmological Arguments

Cosmological arguments argue from a causal principle or pattern in nature to the existence of what is sometimes known as a first cause, but whatever is deduced from what is known as stage one arguments varies from argument to argument.

In this respect, cosmological arguments are a posteriori arguments, arguments that argue from observed data, and are not a priori arguments, like ontological arguments, for example, that argue from the concept of God to God's existence.

2 What Caused God?

Some may[and many have] objected to cosmological arguments by asking what caused God? Why is it that God is immune to an infinite regress? Would this not be question begging, as Richard Dawkins thinks?[a view that he's made very clear in his books like The God Delusion]

It does seem to be question begging, but only if one misunderstands what the various cosmological arguments try to argue for and how they do so.

The objection of what caused God also does seem to be very viable if the theist's causal principle were to be "everything that exists has a cause". Since God exists, He Himself would also need a cause. Thankfully, no serious theist, to my knowledge, has ever put forth such an argument.

Let us take the Argument from Motion, a cosmological argument, as an example. The causal principle for this argument is not "everything has a cause", but "nothing can be moved and mover in the same respect"[to put it simply, to see more, go here]. And from this causal principle, one necessarily arrives at a being that is purely actual, an unmoved mover.

There is no haphazard reasoning going on here. As it is, the argument does not beg the question. The first cause, in this case, the unmoved mover, falls out of the causal principle necessarily.

The same can be said for all cosmological arguments. At least for all that are to be taken seriously.

3 Too Convenient?

But, some might object[as some have] that the theist here is merely fixing their horrible argument. As some popular atheistic YouTubers have characterised[such as Rationality Rules, in his videos critiquing theistic arguments], theists supposedly purposely change the causal principle in their arguments to make sure that their arguments don't fall for the "who caused God?" objection.

But this is simply false. As one will find once they read the philosophers of the past, the causal principles in traditional cosmological arguments did not come from a fear of the "who caused God?" objection, but from natural reasoning and contemplation.

4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the "who caused God?" objection raised by certain new atheist critics don't work in light of the vast theistic philosophical tradition of the past 2500 years[or so].

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Stage 2: From Simplicity to God

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The second stage of the Argument from Composition is to show that the absolutely simple or non-composite being that was deduced in Stage 1 is God. This article will briefly outline the lines of reasoning that leads one to conclude that an absolutely simple being would be God and I will defend them in more detail in future articles. And as a reminder, I use parts to refer to metaphysical and physical parts.

1 Changeless

Since change is the gaining or losing of a part, and an absolutely simple being would have no parts at all, an absolutely simple being would not be able to change.

2 Spaceless, Timeless and Immaterial

Since being made of matter and being spatio-temporally extended implies the ability to change, and the absolutely simple being is changeless, the absolutely simple being must be spaceless, timeless and immaterial.

3 Eternal

Since the absolutely simple being is timeless, it does not begin to nor end to exist, as that implies being in time, which is what it means to be eternal.

4 Unity

Divine Unity states that God is unique and not what we call multiply-instantiable, that is to say, there can only be one God.

Things are distinguished by their parts, but two absolutely simple beings would have the exact same number of parts: none[or one, if you want to think of it like that]. So, any two absolutely simple beings would be identical and therefore would be the same being. This means that there can only ever be one absolutely simple being at any time.

5 Purely Actual

Since the absolutely simple being would be the cause of all composite beings, as discussed in Stage 1, it is at least partially actual, since to cause a thing is to actualise a potential, and only actuality can actualise potential.

However, the absolutely simple being could not be a composite of act and potency, since it is absolutely simple and non-composite, as discussed in Stage 1.

So, the absolutely simple being would have to be purely actual since it is still the cause of all composite beings.

But, as shown in Stage 2: From Pure Act to God, a purely actual being would be omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent and perfect as well.

This also means that the being deduced from the Argument from Motion is the same being deduced from the Argument from Composition.

6 Conclusion

Therefore, an absolutely simple being could only be one, be changeless, spaceless, timeless, immaterial, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent and perfect. This is exactly in line with what monotheists claim.

Since an absolutely simple being exists, therefore God exists.

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Stage 1: From Composition to Simplicity

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The Argument from Composition, or, as Feser calls it, "the Neoplatonic Proof", which I will be summarising the first stage of here, first argues for an absolutely simple or non-composite being. To do this, I will first lay out some metaphysical concepts that are required for this argument.

I will probably write other articles to individually defend these concepts and respond to objections that I come across in future, but it's recommended that one takes a look at this article first before starting to read others.

Also, please note that similar metaphysical concepts from the Argument from Motion appear in the Argument from Composition, so skip the sections here that seem familiar if you've already taken a look at the Argument from Motion.

1 Composition

A composed thing would be anything that has parts. For example, my table has physical parts like the individual legs and the tabletop.

However, parts can extend to external factors as well. For example, for my table to exist, it needs both its parts and for external factors, such as temperature to be a certain way. The parts of my table must be arranged in the arrangement of a table, or form of a table, if you will. But external factors like the  temperature must also be in a specific range, like not be too high, for the table to exist, lest the table melt[or do whatever tables do when things get too hot].

Parts can also extend to metaphysical parts as well, such as, as seen in the Argument from Motion, act and potency. Beings are composed of act and potency as much as they are of their physical parts. Properties can also be seen as a metaphysical part.

2 Ontological Priority

As briefly hinted at above, parts are in a sense fundamental to the whole composite being. That is to say, parts can exist without the whole but the whole cannot exist without the parts.

The parts are, so to speak, ontologically prior to the whole and the whole is dependent on the parts[metaphysical and physical].

So, if the parts of a whole weren't arranged in a specific manner with external factors being in a specific manner, then the whole would not be able to exist.

So, in a sense, the parts[metaphysical parts, physical parts, external factors, etc.] of a whole cause the whole to exist. And this causal series, as we will see, is essentially-ordered.

I elaborate on this point in Change, Existence and Essentially-ordered Causal Series.

3 Essentially-ordered Causal Series

Essentially-ordered causal series are causal series where prior members of the series must continually exist in order for the causal series to continue to exist and for later members to remain as they are in the series as well. Further, in such causal series, there must necessarily be a "first" and most fundamental member, or else the series would not subsist.

To illustrate, take a stack of shirts that have been neatly folded. The shirt at the bottom holds up the shirt above it, which in turn holds up the shirt that is above that. Take the bottom shirt to be a prior member and the shirts above it later members. If the bottom shirt were removed, then this causal series of the shirts at the bottom causing the shirts above it to be held up would cease and the shirts would all drop by one shirt.

In this case, there necessarily had to have been a first shirt or else all the other shirts would have dropped and not be able to cause shirts on top to be held up anymore.

For more on essentially-ordered causal series, read this and this. 

4 Causal Principle

Composite beings[I explain what I mean by being here in the 1 Beings section] must be caused. More specifically, caused by its parts, as discussed above. For example, the existence of a book is caused by its metaphysical and physical parts as well as certain external factors[which could themselves be said to be some sort of metaphysical part, but that can be discussed another time].

Further, composite beings cannot be caused by itself, since nothing can be the cause of itself, as to be able to cause oneself assumes that oneself is already in existence. This is, as Feser characterises, an explanatory vicious circle.

5 Absolute Simplicity

With all the background metaphysics in place, let us reason from the existence of composite objects to the existence of a being that is absolutely simple or non-composite.

First, we being by observing that composite objects exist. This is an obvious fact of our reality.

Composite beings[or objects] must be caused, say by its parts. Yet, these parts must themselves be caused by, say, smaller parts. But, as noted above, this series is an essentially-ordered causal series, meaning that it has a most fundamental member.

This fundamental member cannot be yet another composite being, or else it would have to be itself caused by another thing. So, the fundamental member must be an absolutely simple or utterly non-composite being that has no parts and does not need to be caused by another being while being the cause of all composite beings.

Formal Articulation of Stage 1

Put more formally, the argument would go like:

P1 composite beings exist

P2 composite beings must be caused

P3 this causal series is essentially-ordered

P4 so, it must have a most fundamental member

P5 this fundamental member is either yet another composite being or an absolutely simple being

P6 this fundamental member cannot be a composite being

P7 therefore, this fundamental member is an absolutely simple being

P8 therefore, an absolutely simple being exists

Further Defenses of Claims Made Here

• A Critique of Brute Facts as Explanation

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Atheism and Belief

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It's a common claim from atheists that they merely lack belief. Specifically, what they mean is that they lack belief in any God or god. Though I have encountered some that claim that they lack belief in anything. Now, this is obviously problematic and ultimately self-refuting. But I think it good to explain why that is the case in this article. I will also explain why it is that atheists do in fact have beliefs. I will also discuss how the realisation that atheism is a positive claim affects theist-atheist discussions.

1 Belief

Maybe it would be profitable to begin by trying to answer the question of what belief is.

The term "belief" is used a lot in the area of Epistemology, the study of knowledge, as a necessary precondition for knowledge. While it's controversial exactly what set of criteria would be sufficient for knowledge, belief is always one of them.

Belief, simply put, would be achieved when one thinks a proposition to be true. For example, if I were to say that I believed that I was writing this article right now, then I would be saying that I thought that the proposition "I am writing this article right now" is true.

To put the term belief in the context of theism and atheism, when one says that they believe in the existence of God[or a god], they are saying that they think that the proposition "God exists" or "a god exists" is true. If they thought that it was false, they would be said to not believe in it.

Further, to not believe in something is equivalent to believing in the negation of something. For example, if I don't believe that there is a sandwich in front of me, then I believe that there is no sandwich in front of me. It's a seemingly overly-pedantic qualification, but it will be useful later.

It will also be useful to point out that not believing, disbelief and lack of belief are equivalent. To denote agnosticism, one should say that they withhold judgement entirely.

2 Atheism and Agnosticism

Now that we have properly defined "belief", I hope that it's starting now more apparent why atheists' claim to lack belief is so problematic.

If they do not think that the proposition "God exists" is true or false, then what they think? Maybe they do not have any opinion regarding this proposition whatsoever - they've merely suspended judgement.

Yet if this were the case, then they would no longer be atheists, but agnostics. And if atheism and agnosticism refer to the same thing, then we should just remove one of the labels and call everyone either an agnostic or an atheist.

So that can't be right, especially not in light of the claims that self-identifying atheists constantly make. Namely, that no such God exists. It seems as though atheists don't believe in God's existence, rather than merely withhold judgement regarding it.

And as we pointed out just now, not believing in God's existence is equivalent to believing that God does not exist. This means that atheists do hold to a position: that God does not exist.

If one were to claim that they withheld judgement, then they would qualify as an agnostic, rather than an atheist.

And I'm not the only one to point this fact out. A prominent and formidable atheist philosopher, Dr. Graham Oppy, has been on record saying that atheism is best described as the belief or claim that exactly no God or gods exist. You can take a look at that here.

3 Semantics

Now, let me take some time to address common objections to the claim that atheism is the claim or belief that no God or gods exist.

One of these common objections, and the most popular, from my experience, would be to analyse the etymology of the words theism and atheism and proceed to argue that theism relates to belief in general and atheism, being the negation of theism[since the prefix "a-" usually denotes a negation], means a lack of belief in general.

There are many, many more lines of reasoning that I've heard and read online. However, there is simply no need for me to address any of these[especially since almost all of them equivocate at some point or another].

Rather, I merely have to point out the simple fact that words have meanings. Specifically, words at certain time periods have certain meanings. These meanings inevitably change.

Yet we do not constantly search up a word's etymology to use the meanings of words from a thousand years ago. Why? Because we all understand that if we were to do that, society would never get things done. That's why it's best to stick to the definitions that society agrees on.

For the word "atheism", everyone agrees[and have been agreeing for hundreds of years] that it means "disbelief or lack of belief in the existence of God or gods"[according to Google][and as I have already pointed out, not believing, disbelief and lack of belief are equivalent]. And that an "agnostic" is " a person who believes that nothing is known or can be known of the existence or nature of God"[also from Google][and this also shows us that agnosticism is itself a position].

So, in order to allow for proper debate and discussion among theists and atheists, we should all just use the definitions of terms that have been accepted in the field of Philosophy of Religion by theists and atheists alike for centuries.

4 Falsifiability

Further, admitting that theism, atheism and agnosticism are all claims about the nature of reality can help forward the conversation, since claims can be falsified, but lacks of beliefs cannot, at least not directly.

This will help us in our search for truth and wisdom, as we can test each other's claims and see which worldview comes out on top, through arguments and other considerations.

While this isn't an issue, as far as I can see, among professional philosophers of religion, it is an issue among online theists, atheists and agnostics.

5 Conclusion

In summary, belief is to think that a certain proposition is true, and we all have beliefs. Our beliefs determine our positions on certain topics.

For the sake of moving the conversation between theists, atheists and agnostics forward, we should all admit that we have a worldview and each take a stance on a specific proposition.

Any attempt to avoid this is usually detrimental to our quest for truth, and also usually commits some sort of fallacy.

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Stage 2: From Pure Act to God

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The second stage of the Argument from Motion is to show that the being of pure act that was deduced in stage 1 must be God. This article will briefly outline the lines of reasoning that one could give to deduce the specific properties of the purely actual being, I will go into more detail in other articles in future.

1 Changeless

Since change is an actualisation of a potential and a purely actual being would have no potential to be actualised, this being cannot change.

2 Spaceless, Timeless and Immaterial

Since a being of pure act is changeless, and being in space and time and being made of matter implies change and potential, a being of pure act would be spaceless, timeless and immaterial.

3 Eternal

Since the being is timeless, it cannot have a beginning or end, as that implies being subject to some temporal order, so it is eternal.

4 Unity

Divine Unity states that God is not a particular being, of which there can be multiple of the same type, but that He is unique, in that there could only be one God.

Two or more beings can only be distinguished by their properties. However, two beings of pure act would have the exact same properties. So, there would be no way to distinguish them and they would be identical. This means that there can only be one being of pure act.

5 Perfection

For a being to be imperfect, it must have some unactualised potential, but a purely actual being has no potential to be unactualised. So a purely actual being would have to be perfect.

6 Omnibenevolent

Things are bad insofar as they have unactualised potential, but a purely actual being has no potential to be unactualised. So, a purely actual being would be good. A purely actual being also is perfect, which entails perfect goodness.

7 Omnipotence

Power is the ability to actualise potential. Since a being of pure act would be the one actualising all potential[as there is only one such being actualising all potential], it would be the source of all power[and all possible power]. This means that it is omnipotent.

8 Omniscience

The purely actual being is the one that actualises all potential, meaning that it is the source of all things in existence[since everything in existence but the purely actual being would have unactualised potential and therefore be actualised by the purely actual being], which includes concrete objects.

However, due to the Principle of Proportionate Causality, that states that every effect must be in one way or another in its total cause, all concrete objects must be, in some way, in the purely actual being, as it is the cause of all concrete objects.

Yet these concrete objects cannot be in the purely actual being concretely, so they must be in it conceptually or abstractly.

Further, concepts can only exist in minds. So, the purely actual being must have a mind that knows all concepts[as all possible concepts would have to be actualised by the purely actual being to be concrete]. This means that the purely actual being is omniscient.

9 Conclusion

Therefore, a being of pure act could only be one, would be changeless, spaceless, timeless, immaterial, eternal, perfect, omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. These all align perfectly with the standard claim made by monotheists.

Since a purely actual being exists, therefore God exists.

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The Argument from Motion, B-Theory and Cartesian Doubt

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I've come across an objection to the Argument from Motion that uses a more modern approach and asks how do we really know that change exists, in light of skepticism and the B-Theory of time? I explain the Aristotelian theory of act and potency here. Just a quick note, these objections and responses aren't original to me and come from others that I have read. However, I may occasionally give some of my own thoughts, whenever I see fit.

1 Eternalism

For one, could Eternalism[B-Theory] not be true and Presentism[A-Theory] false[I give a mediocre explanation of the two theories of time here]? If Eternalism, which is also known as the Static Theory of Time, is true, then surely change, as characterised in the Argument from Motion could not be said to exist. This is because all things in all moments exist simultaneously in Eternalism, so it doesn't make sense to say that potentials are actualised as nothing has potential in this view and just is.

2 Cartesian Doubt

Further, how do we really know if the external world even exists? If it doesn't, then surely change, as assumed by the Argument from Motion could not be said to exist. This is because if the external world does not exist, then the purported change that we exist also cannot exist. Which means no potentials are actually actualised.

3 Response

To respond to these two objections, which both attack the notion that change actually exists, I could argue that Presentism is true and that the external world really does exist, respectively. While these two tasks are certainly not difficult to complete, and I may attempt to do so in future, for the Argument for Motion, there is no need to go to such lengths.

We can merely observe, as Descartes does in his Meditations on First Philosophy, that while we may not be able to know if the external world exists, we can know for certain that our perceptions and mental states really exist[whether or not they correspond to anything real].

Further, we can note that our perceptions and mental states really do change. This is obvious from the fact that our mental states follow one after another. This is how one can even consider the arguments for and against the existence of change. Your mental states must change to follow my arguments sentence-by-sentence.

If your mental states can change, then your mental states must have potentials that are then actualised, or else it could not undergo change. This follows from the Aristotelian analysis of change.

3.1 Accidentally-ordered Causal Series

Yet one might notice that the actualisation of the potentials of mental states is an accidentally-ordered causal series, which does not require a first member, and therefore no purely actual actualiser[as discussed here].

Does this then mean that the above objections falsify that Argument from Motion, as we're only left with the type of motion that wouldn't lead us to a purely actual being?

3.2 Essentially-ordered Causal Series

I don't think so, that is because an accidentally-ordered causal series presupposes the existence of an essentially-ordered causal series.

For every accidentally-ordered causal series, it will have individual members, and these members will have potentials that are actualised[that is why they exist].

And as I demonstrate here, the existence of a thing at any given time involves an essentially-ordered causal series.

Since the individual members of an accidentally-ordered causal series exist, then their existence presupposes an essentially-ordered series.

In the case of mental states, the existence of every individual mental state presupposes that there is an essentially-ordered causal series, which would necessitate a purely actual being, which means that the Argument from Motion would be successful.

4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the Argument from Motion would still be successful in skeptical scenarios as well as in the B-Theory of time, as we can always know that our mental states change. While the changing of these mental states suppose an accidentally-ordered causal series, this series supposes an essentially-ordered causal series, meaning that a purely actual being would still have to exist.

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